Herding and contrarian behaviour are often-cited features of real-world financial markets. Theoretical models of continuous trading that study herding and contrarianism, however, usually do not allow traders to choose when to trade or to trade more than once. We present a large-scale experiment to explore these features within a tightly controlled laboratory environment.
Introduction
During the 2008 Financial Crisis stock markets displayed extraordinary fluctuations. From September to mid-November 2008, there were eight days when the Dow Jones Industrial Average changed by more than 5% in absolute terms (from close to close). Since World War II there have been only sixteen other days where the day-to-day change exceeded 5% in absolute value. Moreover, although we perceive the time of the 2008 crisis as a time of market decline, there were two days when the Dow rose by more than 10%. Intra-day fluctuations were even more pronounced: on fourteen days the maximum and minimum prices levels between two days were more than 10% apart. Such extreme price fluctuations are possible only if there are substantial changes in behaviour (from buying to selling or the reverse). Such behaviour and the resulting price volatility are often claimed to be inconsistent with rationally motivated trading and informationally efficient prices. Commentators invariably attribute dramatic swings to investors' animal instincts, which to most economists, is a deeply unsatisfying explanation. "Rational herding theory", on the other hand, provides new theoretical insights that show that seemingly erratic, switching back-and-forth behaviour can be driven by rational, information-based motives.
Herding theory was pioneered by Welch (1992) , Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) who highlight that rationality is no defence against the randomness of herd behaviour.
1 Put simply, a few early incorrect decisions, through a process of rational observation and inference, can have serious ramifications for all who follow.
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A loose application of herding theory to financial market trading might suggest that early movements by visible traders can provide a catalyst for momentum trading, induce discontinuous price jumps in one direction or the other, and potentially leave share prices far from their fundamental value.
The early work on rational herding was not designed, however, for security market trading since it did not admit prices that react to actions, whereas one key feature of financial markets is that (efficient) market prices adjust after trades, with prices dropping after sales and rising after buys. Furthermore, those models that do admit moving prices restrict agents to act in a strict, exogenous sequence -they cannot decide when to 1 The first published paper on the breakdown of informational learning by rational agents is Welch (1992) ; it is also the first application of herding theory to a financial market setting.
2 Consider a setting in which agents receive an informative but noisy signal about which of two states is better. Suppose state A is truly worse than state B. Then it is possible that the first two agents happen to draw incorrect signals, and thereby opt for A. For agent 3, under a natural indifference condition, this means disregarding whatever signal she possesses and following the actions of the first two agents. All later agents find themselves in the same position as the third agent and will follow in the same manner even though they realize that it is only the information conveyed in the first two actions that determines behaviour. As the direction of the herd disproportionately depends on the first movers, the ultimate outcome is exposed to a degree of randomness that is not warranted by fundamentals. 1 trade. Finally, the latter models also restrict traders to act only once. In one of the largest laboratory experimental studies of its type (with around 2000 trades spread over 6 treatments) we bring together all of these features: a model of financial trading with asymmetric information across traders, the potential for rational herding and rational contrarianism, the ability to time trades, and the ability to trade more than once.
To understand our contribution it is important to understand the history of the literature. It was first thought that when prices can adjust to actions information based herding was either not possible or economically irrelevant. A path-breaking paper by Avery and Zemsky (1998) introduced efficient prices to a sequential herding context, but showed that in a simple financial market-trading setting with two values herding is not possible because the market price always separates people with good and bad information so that the former always buy and the latter always sell. Experimental work has confirmed these predictions (Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) , Cipriani and Guarino (2005) , Cipriani and Guarino (2009) ). More recently, however, Park and Sabourian (2011) showed that with multiple states herding can arise and they gave conditions on information that must be satisfied to admit rational herding; they also described conditions for rational contrarianism.
3 They showed that (economically meaningful) herding can arise by traders who believe that extreme outcomes (big price rises or falls) are more likely than moderate ones, and that contrarianism can arise by traders who believe that moderate outcomes are more likely. The signals that generate these situations are, respectively, U-shaped and hill-shaped. An experiment by (Park and Sgroi (2009)) showed that this expanded theory has bite. We employ the information-based trading framework developed by Park and Sabourian (2011) in our experiment.
Next, in a market-trading environment where learning from others is important, the timing of actions may affect the possibility and extent of herding.
4 First, one of the key 3 Rational contrarianism is often cited as an important force for the mean-reversion of asset prices, see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) . 4 The seminal paper which studies investment timing with multiple agents and a single irreversible action, but without moving prices, is Chamley and Gale (1994) and is also explored in Gale (1996) . Their key message is that decision makers will act very quickly in response to their information, since waiting only makes sense when additional, new information arises. The first published experiment to consider herding in endogenous-time was Sgroi (2003) , a close implementation of Chamley and Gale (1994) . This framework was also examined experimentally in Ziegelmeyer, My, Vergnaud, and Willinger (2005) . We complement this line of work by explicitly considering prices that adjust after actions. There are also two other related experimental papers and a theoretical paper. Bloomfield, O'Hara, and Saar (2005) study a financial market in which people can trade repeatedly throughout a trading day. The focus of their study is on the timing behaviour of informed traders and on their choice of limit or market orders depending on the passage of time. They do not employ information that could (theoretically) trigger herding or contrarianism. Ivanov, Levin, and Peck (2009) implement Levin and Peck (2008) , which is a model of fixed capital (green-field), non-financial investments, and they develop important insights into the timing behaviour of people's investment choices. Their setting does not, however, consider moving prices. Finally, Smith (2000) studies endogenous timing theoretically in a single trader environment and features of real-world financial frenzies is the clustering of actions in time, a phenomenon that cannot be examined when timing is not considered. Second, one can imagine that removing yet another friction from sequential trading models may make informational herding a non-issue. Alternatively, one can imagine that herding becomes more pronounced as those with herding signals delay their actions and then rush in eventually.
Our experiment can thus shed light on the impact of the endogenous timing of actions on herding. We identify systematic effects caused by information across treatments and participants that are qualitatively in line with theory on the direction of trades, with marginal effects of information that are stronger relative to exogenous timing setups. In particular we see that contrarianism is caused by hill-shaped signals, that herding is caused by U-shaped signals, and that there is a separation of timing of trades across time by which traders with clearly positive and negative information trade systematically before those with U-shaped information. We also identify a new stylized fact in that traders cluster their trading in time, thus complementing clusters in action; there is, however, no evidence that this clustering is information-or herding-driven. In some experimental treatments, we also explore how the ability to trade twice affects behaviour. For lack of a theory these results are much more difficult to interpret. However, behaviour is qualitatively similar to the single trade treatments, except that trading occurs systematically earlier.
Overview. Section 2 provides a formal definition of herding and contrarianism. Section 3 outlines the guiding theoretical framework and develops qualitative hypotheses. Section 4 examines the design of the experiment and lists the different treatments. Section 5 studies the impact of information on the decision of the trade-direction. Section 6 analyzes the impact of information on the absolute and relative timing of actions (in particular, on clusters). Section 7 studies the differential implications of the two vs. one trade settings. Section 8 summarizes the key findings and concludes. The supplementary appendix outlines examinations of alternative explanations, a discussion of the role of information theory on timing, the subject instructions, and the explicit parameter values.
Definition of Herding and Contrarian Behavior
In the literature there are several definitions of herding. We follow Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011) whose definition focuses on the social learning (learning from others) aspect of behaviour for individual traders that is implied by the notion of herding from the earlier literature. Specifically, this definition follows Brunnermeier (2001)'s (Ch. 5) description of herding as a situation in which "an agent imitates the decision of his predecessor even though his own signal might advise him to take a offers some qualitative predictions as to which sort of information induces rapid decision making.
different action" and we consider the behaviour of a particular signal type by looking at how the history of past trading can induce a trader to change behaviour and trade against his private signal. This definition has been used in other experimental work on social learning in financial markets (see, for instance, Cipriani and Guarino (2005) or Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) ) and it further captures the idea of rational momentum trading, a well-documented financial market trading phenomenon. Both with buy-herding and buy-contrarianism, the trader with signal S prefers to sell at the initial history, before observing other traders' actions (condition (i)), but prefers to buy after observing the history H t (condition (ii)). The key differences between buyherding and buy-contrarianism are conditions (iii-h) and (iii-c). The former the price to rise at history H t so that a change of action from selling to buying at H t is with the general movement of the prices (crowd), whereas the latter condition requires the public expectation to have dropped so that a trader who buys at H t acts against the movement of prices. In our experiment each trader receives a private signal, which is one of three possible signals (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ). It is important to note that herding according to our definition does not imply that, after some history, all traders take the same action irrespective of their private signal. Such a situation would imply an informational cascade and would be inconsistent with moving prices and an informationally efficient financial market. To see why, consider the role of prices as reflecting the information contained in the traders' actions.
If all informed types act alike then their actions would be uninformative, and as result, prices would not move. Therefore, such uniformity of behaviour cannot explain prices movements, which is a key feature of financial markets. Moreover, if the uniform action involves trading, then a large imbalance of trades would accumulate without affecting prices -contrary to common empirical findings.
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Our definition is the same as that commonly employed in the literature on informational herding, which allows comparability of our results. There are, however, other plausible definitions of herding and contrarianism.
6 Instead of defining herding and con-5 See, for instance, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) . 6 See also Brunnermeier (2001) , Chamley (2004 ), or Vives (2008 for related definitions of herding, 4 trarianism as switches of behaviour relative to price movements since the beginning of trading as in (iii-h), one could define herding and contrarianism as switches relative to the most recent price movements or actions. For instance, someone with negative information would engage in buy herding if she buys after the price rose by x units or after observing a sequence of y buys. The difficulty of such a classification is to find the indisputable criterion for the "right" number of recent actions or the right size of recent price movements. One could also define herding and contrarianism relative to the majority action. Herding would then be defined as a switch to adopting the majority action;
contrarianism would be defined as a switch to taking the opposite of the majority action. Herding and contrarian behaviour according to such a definition would, however, occur under similar circumstances as under our definition because, at least loosely, if the majority buys, prices rise, if the majority sells, prices fall so that, for instance, buy herding would arise when prices rise. 
The Guiding Theory and Testable Predictions
Subjects face a complex decision problem, having to decide both on the timing and direction of their trade. In the following, we split the description into the trade-direction ("static") and the trade-timing component; yet we emphasize that a full equilibrium model requires a simultaneous description of both.
Trade Direction. The idea behind informational herding is best explained by example. "FI", a financial institution, has a key competitor that has just declared bankruptcy.
This may be good for FI because they may be able to attract the failed competitor's customers. If this situation materializes, a share of FI is worth V h . The competitor's failure may also be bad since FI may have made the same mistakes as the failed bank; a share of FI is then worth V l < V h . We are interested in the behaviour of a privately informed investor, who received a (noisy) signal S and who observes several sales. Sales, loosely, convey that the sellers had negative information. We ask if it is possible that a trader sells when he observes many sales, even though his private (noisy) signal alone tells him that FI is worth
is fixed. Then for any signal S with Pr(V h |S) < 1 there exists a number of sales x large including for non-financial market environments. See also Park and Sabourian (2011) for an extensive discussion of the definition.
7 One can imagine further, broader definitions that, for instance, dispense with the initial benchmark and define herding or contrarianism only relative to the actions of recent predecessor(s). For example, one could classify a trader as engaging in herding if the trader takes the same action compared to the most recent predecessor. Yet dropping the benchmark is problematic. Suppose, for instance, that two traders both have favourable information and buy one after the other. Arguably, they buy because of their information, not because everyone else or their immediate predecessor takes the same action. 5 enough such that, upon observing x sales, E[V |S, x sales] < p. In other words, even if the private signal favours state V h , Pr(S|V h ) > Pr(S|V l ), the trader sells because his private information is swamped by the negative information derived from observing early sales.
There are two shortcomings to this argument. First, the price in financial markets is not fixed. Second, traders cannot choose when to trade. The second point will play a significant role in our experimental analysis. On the first point, if, as is a common in financial market models, the price would be such that p = E[V |information contained in all past trades], then we would have that for all past trading activity p ≶ E[V |S] if and only if Pr(S|V l ) ≶ Pr(S|V h ). In other words, if the price responds to information derived from trading, someone with favourable information would never sell, ruling out herding. Experimental evidence has confirmed this (see Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005))). Park and Sabourian (2011) , however, have found that when there are more than two possible outcomes, herding in the sense of traders trading against their information with the majority is possible. Our experiment is guided by the qualitative ideas of their model.
The idea in Park and Sabourian (2011) can be best explained, once again, by example. Consider the above banking example with a third outcome, one in which FI is unaffected by its competitor's failure, associated with value V m with V l < V m < V h .
8 Assume all outcomes are equally likely. We are interested in the behaviour of an investor, who has a private signal S, after different public announcements. Specifically, consider a good public announcement G that rules out the worst state, Pr(V l |G) = 0, and a bad public announcement B that rules out the best state, Pr(V h |B) = 0. Assume that the price of the stock is equal to the expected value of the asset conditional on the public information and that the investor buys (sells) if his expectation exceeds (is less than) the price. Note that the price will be higher after G and lower after B, compared to the ex-ante situation when all outcomes are equally likely. Both G and B eliminate one state, so that, after each such announcement there are only two states left. In two state models, an investor has a higher (lower) expectation than the market if and only if his private information is more (less) favourable towards the better state than towards the worse state. Thus, in the cases of G and B,
Hence, for example, after good news G, an investor buys (sells) if he thinks, relative to the market, that it is more (less) likely that FI will thrive than be unaffected. It follows from the above that the investor buys after G and sells after B if and only if Pr(S|V h ) > Pr(S|V m ) and Pr(S|V l ) > Pr(S|V m ). Such an investor, loosely, herds in the sense that he acts like a momentum trader, buying with rising and selling with falling prices. The private information (conditional probabilities) that is both necessary and sufficient for such behaviour has thus a U-shape. Conversely, the investor sells after G and buys after B if and only if Pr(S|V h ) < Pr(S|V m ) and Pr(S|V l ) < Pr(S|V m ). Such an investor, loosely, trades contrary to the general movement of prices. The private information that is both necessary and sufficient to generate such behaviour has thus a hillshape. Formally, we distinguish four possible shapes of signal likelihood functions (LF):
For the results in our paper it is also important whether the likelihood of a signal is higher in one of the extreme states V l or V h relative to the other extreme state. We thus define the bias of a signal S as Pr(S|V h ) − Pr(S|V l ). A U-shaped LF with a negative bias, Pr(S|V h ) − Pr(S|V l ) < 0, will be labeled as an nU-shaped LF and a U-shaped LF with a positive bias, Pr(S|V h ) − Pr(S|V l ) > 0, will be labeled as a pU-shaped LF. Similarly, we use nHill (pHill) to describe a Hill-shaped LF with a negative (positive) bias. A signal is called monotonic if its LF is either increasing or decreasing and non-monotonic if its LF is hill or U-shaped. In what follows, we will refer to signals with a particular shape of likelihood function or a trader who receives such a signal by the shape only (e.g. a signal S with an increasing LF is referred to as an increasing signal).
Note that in the example, G and B are exogenous public announcements. In general, however, public announcements or, more rather, public information is created endogenously by the history of publicly observable trading with, loosely, G signifying a prevalence of buying, B a prevalence of selling.
Experimental Parameters. There are three states, V ∈ {V l , V m , V h } = {75, 100, 125}, all are equally likely, Pr(V l ) = Pr(V m ) = Pr(V h ). We have two types of traders: informed traders (our laboratory subjects, who make up 75% of the trading population and who can buy, sell or hold as they wish); and noise traders (controlled in the lab by the computer, accounting for 25% of the trading population who buy or sell with equal probability). While not necessary for the result, we use noise traders since we worried that subjects' ability to count the number of trades and compare them to the number of subjects in the room might distort the results.
9 The experimental implementation of noise traders was as follows: for a given number of possible trading decisions, noise traders were added so that the ratio of noise to informed was roughly 1/3 (e.g. with 15 subjects, we added 5 noise traders). A coin toss for each noise trader determined whether this trader would buy or sell. Their trade time (see below) was then a uniform draw for the possible trade times (in seconds) from [0, 180] . Subjects can observe all previous prices H t . In addition, each receives one of three signals, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , which are private and conditionally i.i.d. informative. Subjects further receive information about the signal likelihood function (hereafter: LF). Each treatment had an increasing signal (S 3 ), a decreasing signal (S 1 ) and a non-monotonic signal (S 2 ).
The rational choice for informed traders (assuming indifferent agents buy) is to buy if their expectation of the value exceeds the price and to sell otherwise. To simplify the experimental setting, buys and sales happen at a single price, which is set by a computer.
Subjects know that the price will adjust upwards after a buy and downwards after a sell and they can thus infer actions from past prices (an up-tick indicates that there was a buy, a down-tick indicates a sale).
Trade Timing. The herding theory that we allude to above is based the assumption that traders act in an exogenous, predetermined sequence. In reality and in our experiment they can trade whenever they want and we thus add to the theory by studying this important aspect. Generally, there is no tractable model to provide us with firm predictions about traders' timing decisions. We can, nevertheless obtain some theoretical guidance. Smith (2000) provides a model in which a single trader who can make a single trade at one of two points in time (early or late). His results intuitively extend to the case of multiple traders.
10 Smith shows that a trader with a "good" or "bad" news signal will trade early. In the Park and Sabourian (2011) setup, such signals have monotonic LFs. Moreover, Smith also presents an example with a U-shaped signal and shows that within his framework the recipient of such a signal would delay. In addition, we also ran simulations (available upon request) of the trade-timing decision for the parameters used in our experiments that indicate that for recipients of hill-and U-shaped signals there exists a set of parameters for which delay is optimal. The basic intuition of the timing decision is that traders generally expect prices to move in the direction of the state which they consider most likely to occur. Traders who think that the highest or lowest state is most likely (they have increasing/decreasing LFs)
should then act earliest because early in the round prices are (in their opinion) furthest from their favoured state and thus profit opportunities are largest. 11 Hill-shaped signals 10 In Smith (2000) the trader obtains a piece of information about a public signal that will be released. After the release of this public signal, prices will adjust instantaneously to the fundamental value implied by the signal. To see the equivalence to our setting assume that people choose a trading action (buy, sell or pass) in accordance with the optimal actions prescribed by the "static" exogenous-time theory discussed earlier in this section. Then their actions will affect the price and (noisily) reveal traders' information. Thus the price at the end of the trading day is, loosely, a sufficient statistic for all traders' private information. Moreover, the price is public information. Thus the price at the end of the trading day is the same as the price in Smith (2000) after the release of the public signal. A trader's information in our model can thus be understood as a signal about the information that will be revealed through trading.
11 Formally, traders with increasing (decreasing) signals expectations of the public expectations are sub are slightly different: when trading starts, prices will first be close to the hill-shaped type's favoured value. As prices move away from their favoured value, trading against the movement of prices becomes most profitable. So even though their signal is quite informative they may delay trading. At the beginning of a treatment, U-shaped types are least sure about the direction that prices might take and they may thus delay to learn first from the behaviour of others.
Qualitative hypotheses implied by the theory. Combing the theoretical insights, we can develop a number of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Decreasing types sell, and increasing types buy. If we observe herding then this is most likely to be caused by U-shaped types. If we observe contrarianism, then this is most likely caused by hill-shaped types.
In analyzing their timing behaviour we will look at the distribution of trading times and we are interested in the relative ordering of the distributions of trading times for the different signal types. This yields the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 U-shaped types will act later than monotonic types. Hill-shaped types will act before U-shaped types. Hill-shaped types act after the first few trades have occurred.
Multiple Trades. In much of what is to follow we are concerned with a setting where traders can act only once. Since, in reality, people can trade multiple times, and since there is no information-based theory that is able to describe behaviour and the influence of information, we have also explored an experimental setting in which people can trade twice. With two trades possible, we conjecture that types with bad and good news should still sell and and buy respectively, and they should do so rather sooner than later. Moreover, as prices move, traders' information rents are reduced in expectation and thus the greater the number of trades, the more intense is the competition for information rents. A very straightforward assertion is thus that trades should occur earlier when people can trade more often. We will explore the two-trade case in detail in the penultimate section.
Implementation of the market price in the experiment. One conceptual difficulty that arises in the experimental implementation is the manner in which the price is set and updated by the central computer. For lack of a theory we used the reasonable updating rule by which prices adjust assuming that the most recent trade was taken in accordance with the optimal decision under exogenous-timing as implied by Park and Sabourian (2011) . For instance, in a setting with a negative U-shaped signal and absent herding, a buy would have been assumed to come from either a noise trader or an informed (super) martingales and they thus believe that future prices will move against them.
9
trader with an increasing signal.
12 See section 4.1 for more details. Note, however, that to detect herding and contrarian behaviour, it is not necessary that the price is set according to any theory-the definitions speak only of increasing or decreasing prices. We are, in fact, not testing a particular theory in all its details, but, instead, are interested in the qualitative implications with regards to the impact of information.
We could have used other price-setting mechanisms. For instance, we could have followed Cipriani and Guarino (2005) and used subjects as market makers; they did this in one treatment and had two participants set prices. Our particular framework, however, is rather complex and with human traders on both sides (market making and active trading) we would need to worry about how traders form expectations about market makers and vice versa. Notwithstanding this point, Cipriani and Guarino (2005) found behaviour to be robust with respect to variations in the price-setting rules.
13 Another possible variation of the price setting mechanism is to include a transaction cost, such as a bid-ask-spread.
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Experimental Design
Here we discuss the experimental design, the information provided to the subjects, and the differences between treatments. The supplementary appendix contains a time-line (Appendix C), a full set of instructions and the materials given to subjects (Appendices D-F), and a description of the custom software used in this experiment (Appendix G).
Overview
Each group of traders was made up of 13-25 experimental subjects. At the beginning of the session, subjects were given information about the trading system, the kind of signals that they may receive, and the functioning of the market. Subjects were told that they would not interact directly with each other but rather that the trades were with a central computer. Subjects were explicitly told that the price would be increased by the central computer following a buy decision, and would be decreased following a sell decision and that they would have access to the full price history generated by the central computer (provided by the experimental software in the form of a price-chart).
Prior to running sessions, for each of the six rounds, we had a random draw for the true value (and thus in all sessions, subjects received signals according to the same LF). For each round, each subject received a private signal, either S 1 , S 2 , or S 3 , where signals were drawn using the LFs for the underlying treatment given the true value draw (e.g., the practice round was based on a treatment with an nU-shaped LF and true value V = 100).
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Prior to the start of each treatment, subjects were provided with an information sheet detailing the signal likelihood function (i.e. information about all possible signals) and the posteriors that each signal would imply. The information on the sheet was common knowledge to all subjects. The subjects were not told anything about the implications of U-shaped, hill-shaped or monotonic LFs.
All of the experimental subjects took part in all of the rounds in each session (the practice round plus all 6 incentivized rounds) and they were all made aware of this fact. The practice round was special in two senses. Firstly, it was not incentivized and this was stressed, so subjects could use it to get used to the software, and as such it is not included in the results. Secondly, they were allowed to ask questions pertaining to understanding, after the practice round. Information for the round was presented in the same format as for the incentivized rounds.
The subjects received financial incentives to ensure that they took the tasks seriously as is standard practice within experimental economics (excluding the unpaid practice round). First, subjects were provided with a show-up fee of £5 (in UK currency, or equivalent in Canadian currency) and this was known to the subjects. Second, it was explained to the subjects that their bonus payment would depend precisely upon the actual value of each share and the price at which they sold or bought the share (both denominated in virtual currency units or VCU) and examples were given to make this clear, for example: "If you buy a share at a price of 90 vcu, and after the event takes place the price of the share is updated to 125 vcu. You have therefore made 35 vcu of virtual profits on your trade. If you instead sold at 90 vcu you would have lost 35 vcu. If you did nothing you would make a profit of 25 vcu since your share was originally worth 100 vcu and is worth 125 vcu after the event is realized." It was further explained to the subjects that the central computer would maintain a running total of their winnings in VCU after each round and this would be converted to real currency at the end of the session and that this could reach a possible maximum of £25 (in UK currency, or equivalent in Canadian currency). Subjects made an average of £7.70 in total bonus payments (across all 6 rounds) or £12.70 in total including their show-up fee. The subjects were informed that the rounds would last 3 minutes and that
15 Figures 2-4 in the supplementary appendix describe the signal LFs.
they would receive announcements about the remaining time after 2:30 minutes, and 2:50 minutes. Each round was followed by a cool-off period of about 1-2 minutes and then subjects were given information for the next round. They had about 2-3 minutes to digest this new information. They were told in advance (as early as at the recruitment stage) that each session would last approximately 1 hour.
The existence and proportion of noise traders (roughly 25% of trades, see Section 3) was made known to the subjects in advance. Subjects were also aware that noise traders randomized 50:50 between buying and selling and that they traded at random times.
We considered two classes of treatments: in the first, subjects were allowed to trade once, in the second they could trade twice. The software allowed subjects to trade at most this specific number of times. The sequence of transactions produced a history of actions and prices, H t with t ∈ [0, 180] , that recorded the timing (in seconds), price, and direction of each transaction. Subjects were shown the history in the form of a continuously updating price chart during each treatment, and they were also given the current price, P t , where P 0 = 100.
Subjects were told that they had three possible actions a = {sell, pass, buy} one (or two) of which they could undertake during the 3 minutes of trading time.
16 For the treatments in which two trades were allowed, subjects were additionally informed that they could trade twice, so they could "buy and buy", "sell and sell", "sell and buy", etc. as and when they wished during the three minute period. They were instructed that pressing the "pass"-button would count as one of the actions that they were allowed. It was stressed to the subjects that their virtual profits per treatment were generated based on the difference between the price at which they traded, P t , and the true value of the share, V . It was emphasized that the price at the end of the trading round would not be relevant for their payoffs. The subjects themselves were recruited from the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge and Warwick. No one was allowed to take part twice. We ran 13 sessions in all: 3 at the University of Cambridge (13 subjects each), 6 at the University of Warwick (18, 19, 22, 22, 22 , and 25 subjects) and 4 at the University of Toronto (17, 18, 13, and 13 subjects). We collected demographic data only for the Warwick sessions: of the subjects there, around 49% were female, around 73% were studying (or had already taken) degrees in Economics, Finance, Business, Statistics, Management or Mathematics. 53% claimed to have some prior experience with financial markets, and 23% claimed to own or have owned shares at some point.
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16 The "passing" decision is a relict of a setting with exogenous timing. Instead of pressing a hold button, traders could also just not trade. We have not analyzed this decision separately.
17 Appendix E details the questions asked in the questionnaire. When asked what motivated their decisions (across different rounds) 44% of subjects mentioned a combination of prices and signals, 31%
Treatments
In our setup, each round of play corresponds to a unique treatment.
18 In Treatment 1,2, and 3, subjects were allowed to trade at most once, in treatments 4,5, and 6 subjects were allowed to trade at most twice. Each treatment included signals with an increasing, a decreasing and a non-monotonic LF, where Treatment 1 and 6 had a signal with an nU-shaped LF, Treatment 2 and 4 a signal with a nHill-shaped LF, Treatment 3 and 5 had a signal with a pU-shaped LF. The underlying parameters and signal LFs are listed in the supplementary appendix together with the instructions given to subjects. The specific signal structures by rounds were as follows:
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• Round 1: negative U-shaped LF making buy herding possible;
• Round 2: negative hill-shaped LF making buy-contrarianism possible;
• Round 3: positive U-shaped LF making sell-herding possible;
• Round 4: as Round 2 but with two trades;
• Round 5: as Round 3 but with two trades;
• Round 6: as Round 1 but with two trades.
The same order of treatments was maintained across all sessions. 
Behavioral, non-rational predictions for the static decision
To complete the analysis, we considered the possible impact of risk aversion and loss aversion on decision making, and various behavioural alternatives to Bayesian updating. First, we considered a model in which subjects do not update their beliefs as prices change but act solely on the basis of their prior expectation. Second, we considered one setting in which subjects update their beliefs on the basis of changing prices at a slower rate than they should and one setting in which people overweigh their own private information.
only price, 18% only signal and the remaining 7% had other motivations. 38% thought that in general the current price was more important than the signal, 36% thought the signal was more important than the current price and the remaining 26% felt they were of similar value. Roughly 24% claimed to have carried out numerical calculations.
18 So treatment 1 occurred in round 1, treatment 2 in round 2, etc. 19 The practice round was a one-trade treatment with a negative U-shaped signal structure. 20 Since each round was only played once, and since prior to any rounds a practice round was undertaken we believe that learning between rounds would be minimal. There was no econometric evidence of learning between rounds. For instance, there was no discernible trend in behavior. In untabulated regressions we also clustered standard errors by rounds and double-clustered standard errors by rounds and subjects and found that the results were unchanged.
Finally, we developed error correction models in which subjects account for errors made by their peers and react rationally to these errors; these models are in the spirit of levelk beliefs (see Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) ) and the Quantal Response Equilibrium (see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) ).
The full details of the alternative specifications and tests can be found in Section A of the supplementary appendix.
Signals and Herding or Contrarianism
Observations from Summary Statistics
The total number of trades made by experimental participants was 1991 spread over all 6 treatments; broken up by trader type we have 623 (S 1 ), 786 (S 2 ) and 584 (S 3 ). For treatments 1 to 3 we had 683 trades (197 S 1 , 276 S 2 and 210 S 3 ), for treatments 4-6 there were 1308 (425 S 1 , 510 S 2 and 373 S 3 ) trades. Overall, we observe that the monotonic types, S 1 and S 3 , always sell/buy in 85% of all their trades.
One of the main questions that we want to answer is whether U-shaped signal types switch from selling to buying if prices rise and whether they switch from buying to selling if prices fall, i.e. that they herd in the sense of following the "majority" action. The "static" theory, applicable under exogenous sequencing, of Park and Sabourian (2011) suggests that only U-shaped types would herd. Yet the definition of herding and contrarianism does not rule out that other types herd or act as contrarians. Table 1 gives the raw numbers on trading behaviour, split by signal types.
Finding 1 (Hypothesis 1, summary statistics) U-shaped types herd in 26% of possible cases, hill, increasing and decreasing types herd in 4%, 10% and 21% of all cases. Contrarianism arises more frequently, most stemming from hill-shaped types (67%). Decreasing, increasing, and U-shaped types act as contrarians in 31%, 19% and 37% of all possible cases.
The fraction of herding actions is larger than that observed in Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) or Cipriani and Guarino (2005) ; these papers also found persistent evidence of contrarianism, albeit to a smaller extent.
Regression Analysis of the Trading Direction Decision
We ask the following questions:
(1) Given that someone has a herding (U-shaped) signal, is this person more likely to herd than someone who does not have the herding signal?
(2) Given that someone has a contrarian (hill-shaped) signal, is this person more likely to act as a contrarian than someone who does not have the contrarian signal?
The random assignment of signals to traders allows us to interpret mean differences in signal-specific effects as the average causal effect of the signal. Formally, we estimate the following equations to test whether a type of signal is a significant cause for herding or contrarian behaviour respectively:
where the dependent variables herd i and contra i are dummies that apply the Herding/Contrarianism Definition in the sense that they are set equal to 1 if the current trade by individual i is a herding and contrarian trade respectively and 0 otherwise, α is a constant, and u-shape i and hill-shape i are signal dummies that are set equal to 1 if the individual who performs the current trade received a U-shaped (for the herding estimation) or hill-shaped (for the contrarian estimation) signal. Parameter fixed i is an individual fixed effect that controls for specific traders who persistently err. 21 Given the random assignment of signals, we can assume that E[u-shape i · ǫ i ] = 0 and E[hill-shape i · ǫ i ] = 0, which are the main identifying assumptions. In our estimations we cluster standard errors at the trader (individual) level to correct for unobserved components at the trader level. We run the regressions restricted to the cases for which herding and contrarianism respectively are possible.
In each scenario we estimated the model by logit without fixed effects and by a linear model with fixed effects. For logit estimations, we report the marginal effects at the mean. Further, we report the results across all six treatments; in the penultimate section, we expand the analysis to check if the number of trades affects the estimates (it does not).
For the herding specification, β represents the impact of the signal on the average individual's choice of whether or not to herd. If it is positive and significant, then a U-shaped signal increases the probability of herding relative to all other signals. The first two columns in Table 2 summarize the result from our regression. Overall, obtaining a Ushaped signal increases the probability of herding by about 12% relative to any other signal and it is significant at all conventional levels. Parameter estimates are large unaffected by fixed effects. Overall the regression confirms the hypothesis that recipients of U-shaped herding-type signals are generally more likely to herd.
For the contrarianism specification, coefficient β represents the impact of the signal on the average individual's choice of whether or not to act as a contrarian. If it is positive and significant then the hill-shaped signal increases the probability of contrarianism relative to all other signals. The first two columns in Table 3 summarize the results from our regression. Receiving the hill-shaped signal increases the chance of acting as a contrarian by 36-40% relative to any other kind of signal. All coefficients are significant at all conventional levels. Overall we confirm that the hill-shaped signal is the significant source of contrarianism relative to all other signals.
Finding 2 (Hypothesis 1, regression analysis) The U-shaped and hill-shaped signals are the significant sources for herding and contrarianism respectively.
Our findings here are noteworthy for two reasons. First, (irrational) contrarianism has been observed in other experiments before (e.g. Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) , Cipriani and Guarino (2005) , Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007) ). Thus arguably, people exhibit a general tendency to act against the crowd. Here we show that despite this tendency, contrarianism is still most likely caused by recipients of signals that admit contrarianism theoretically: so observed contrarianism is not necessarily irrational, but may be the result of sensible, information-based considerations. Second, the marginal effect of a U-shaped signal on the probability of herding is stronger than that in our exogenous timing companion paper, Park and Sgroi (2009) . Combined with the fact that U-shaped types do not herd as much as they should theoretically, this implies that due to the timing of actions non-U-shaped types herd proportionately less and U-shaped types herd proportionally more than with exogenous timing: so the importance of signals that are conducive to herding increases with the potential to delay.
Signals and the Timing of Actions
Absolute Timing
The key question to address is whether there are systematic differences in the timing behaviour for the various signal types and treatment settings. To identify such differences, we compare the cumulative distributions of the trade-times for different categories of types. The strongest result that one can hope for in this context is that one cumulative distribution function (henceforth, cdf) of trade-times stochastically dominates another: distribution F first order stochastically dominates distribution G if G is larger than F for all entry times. If we indeed observe that F first order stochastically dominates G, then we can say that the entry times under F are systematically later than under G.
We computed the cdfs for a large variety of subsamples, such as treatments 1-3, 4-5, 4-5 (first trades), and so on. The timing pattern for increasing and decreasing signals showed no differences, neither did positive and negative U-shaped signals. In presenting the results, we thus combine increasing and decreasing signals as "monotonic" signals, and we combine positive and negative U-shaped signals as "U-shaped signals". Moreover, we also aggregate trading times for the respective types across all treatments. Figure 1 provides plots of the relevant differences of cdfs. 22 We find the following.
Finding 3 (Hypothesis 2) U-shaped types trade later than monotonic types.
Consequently, our findings comply with Smith (2000)'s prediction that people with goodnews (increasing) or bad-news (decreasing) signals trade early, and that people who receive mixed information delay. The bottom right panel displays the relation of the hill-shaped types' timing to the U-shaped types.
Finding 4 (Hypothesis 2) On almost the entire domain (apart from the first few seconds) the hill-shaped type trades systematically earlier than the U-shaped types.
To consider Hypothesis 2, one can compare the top right and bottom right panels. As can be seen, for the first few seconds, more trades stem from non-hill-shaped types. Yet after these first few trades, the hill-shaped types trade strongly (this follows as their cdf rises strongly relative to the other cdfs).
Finding 5 (Hypothesis 2) The trades by hill-shaped types are concentrated after the first few transactions have occurred.
In the supplementary appendix we further examine if pure information theory can explain the timing of decisions. As is common in the literature on information theory we use the entropy of posteriors to measure the informativeness of a signal. We observe, however, that information theory does not seem sufficient to explain the timing of decisions.
Relative Timing: Clustering
The word "herding" semantically suggests not only that people take the same action, but also that people act at almost the same time. Definitions of herding (such as ours) and models of herding do not capture the timing decision and, since the models typically force actions to be taken in a strict exogenous sequence, thus have no built-in simultaneity. During the experiments, however, we did observe that traders often acted at almost the same time. This behaviour, which has not been identified before in laboratory experiments, is in the spirit of the mass behaviour that one may associate with herding.
We categorize this trading at almost the same time as "stimulus-response" driven trading in the sense that one trade triggers others in short succession. We thus define a trade to be triggering if it happens 5 or 10 seconds after its predecessor (this time separation avoids spurious proximities of trades) and at least 5 seconds after the first trade in the round. We then define a cluster as a situation where at least 2 more trades occur within 3 seconds of the triggering trade.
23 Table 4 provides summary statistics and indicates that there are a sizeable number of clusters. For instance, those with 5-second delays occur, on average twice in each treatment, those with 10 seconds about once. Furthermore, a large fraction of trades is involved in a cluster (between 21% for 5-second delays and 10% for 10-second delays), which is remarkable because more than 25% of trades occur so early that are excluded by design. There are several questions to ask. First, why do people trade in a cluster? Second, are clustered trades herding or contrarian trades in the sense of trade-direction? Third, do signals plays a role in the decision to cluster?
As for the first question, the simplest explanation for why clusters arise is that some traders play a (delay-) strategy which includes a conditioning of the form "wait until the next trade and then act". If traders play such a strategy then, naturally, one trade may trigger another or several others, 24 and it is important to understand to what extent information affects this type of behaviour. A more complex explanation as to why it may pay to trade in a cluster is as follows. One feature of our experimental setup is that prices are set assuming that each trade is performed by a noise trader with constant probability. Although it would be difficult to argue that a trade that triggers a cluster is more or less likely to be informed, a trade that follows another in close succession may well be more likely by an informed trader. In this case, the price adjustment following this trade is too small because the price adjustment accounts for the possibility of noise. Consequently, one may argue that it may be profitable to be the third person in a cluster and to trade in the same direction as the second.
25 We try to capture this idea in a regression where we control for trades that are in the same direction as their predecessor. To understand all the above questions, we ran the following regression:
where herd i , contra i , u-shape i , increasing i , and decreasing i are the usual herding, contrarianism and signal dummies, cluster i is a dummy that is 1 when the current trade is in a cluster and 0 otherwise, round trip i is a dummy that is 1 if the trader who made this trade makes his other trade in the opposite direction (buy-sell or sell-buy), and same as before i is a dummy that is 1 if the current trade is in the same direction as the trade just before it and zero otherwise. These covariates are, in essence, all effects that could play a role in our analysis. We ran these regressions, as before, for a linear probability model with and as a logit model without fixed effects. Moreover, we classified trade clusters in two ways: the first included the triggering trade as part of the cluster, the second omits the triggering trade. Overall, we find the following:
Finding 6 With the exception of the U-shaped signal for 5-second quiet periods before trades, none of the covariates in (2) is persistently statistically significant.
This finding is, of course, a negative result: although one can argue that clustering may be caused by a delay strategy ("act after the next trade"), one may have suspected that, for instance, signals should have played a role, i.e. that some types of signals are more likely to delay and thus act in clusters than others. Yet we found essentially no persistence or explanation for traders' behaviour, except that the occurrence of clusters themselves and we are thus left with the stylized fact that subjects tend to trade in unison, a finding which represents an important area for future research.
7 The Second Trade
Herding and Contrarian Estimates with One vs. Two Trades
In half of our treatments, subjects have the option to trade twice. One natural question is whether this option affects the impact that signal have on the chance of engaging in herd behaviour. To answer this question, we ran the following regression:
where herd i , contra i , u-shape i , and hill i are the herding, contrarianism, U-shape and hillshape indicators from (1), 1-trade i and 2-trade i are 1 if the trade was made in a one-and two-trade treatments respectively. Parameters β 1 and β 2 then reveal the marginal effect of a U-and hill-shaped signal respectively in the one-and two-trade treatments. The third and fourth columns in Tables 2 and 3 
The Impact of Round-Trip Trades
The fact that signals have a reduced effect on the second trade is noteworthy. One possibility is that subjects followed an altogether different strategy when making their second trade. Namely, with two trades, traders have the opportunity to make so-called "round-trip" or "return" trades by selling first and then buying later or vice versa. This way, they can realize a trading profit in the process. Table 6 provides summary statistics for the second trade in general, and shows that about 23% of second trades are part of a round trip transaction. About 76% of the return trades yielded a trading profit which suggests that return-trades were performed on the basis of "buy low, sell high" (or "sell high, buy low"). Furthermore, most of round-trip trades are performed by the hill-and U-shaped types.
All this indicates, that traders may well have a particular, possibly non-informationbased strategy, in their trading and that this may affect our estimate of herding and contrarianism. A trader who merely aims to buy low and sell high may thus act for reasons that have little to do with his information. Yet in our analysis thus far, this trader's actions may be classified as herding or contrarian and we would thus obtain spurious estimates.
We thus analyze to what extent our estimates in Tables 2 and 3 change when we take account of this possible misclassification. We ask the following question: what is the probability that a first/second trade is a herding trade conditional on the trade being a return trade (when herding is possible) relative to the case where it is not a return trade?
To answer this question, we ran the following regressions
The dependent variables herd i and contra i are the herding and contrarian dummies from the equations in (1), u-shape i and hill-shape i are the signal dummies, α is a constant, return trade i is a dummy for the incidence of a return trade (both the first and second transaction of a return trade have value 1), and u-shape i × return trade i and hill-shape i × return trade i are products of the two dummies. For each case we estimated the model by logit, restricted to incidences where herding and contrarianism respectively can occur, and we report the marginal effects. The coefficient β 1 allows us to estimate the marginal effect among non-return traders and the coefficient β 3 allows us to estimate the differential marginal effect among return traders, so that β 1 + β 3 allows us to determine the effect of a signal among return traders. Table 7 summarizes our findings and indicates that our herding estimates from Section 5 are biased downwards by round-trip trades (the coefficients on the product term are negative and significant) and that our contrarian estimates are unaffected. This is good news for our analysis as it indicates that, if anything, the effect of a herding signal as a source for herd behaviour is underestimated by the possibility of round trip transactions. 
The Timing of Actions with One vs. Two Trades
Our final question concerns the timing of trades of one-trade relative to two-trade treatments. Since informed traders compete to exploit their private information, more trades imply higher competition for information rents which, under our price-setting regime, should speed up trading. The panels in Figure 2 plot the differences of cdfs of timing, where we aggregated all trades in treatments 1-3 and 4-6 as well as first and second trades in treatments 4-6. To assess this finding, suppose subjects' timing strategies for their trade time T in the single trade treatment could be described by some density f on [0, 180] and consider the following two timing strategies as benchmarks.
26 In the first, traders choose the times for their two trades τ i , τ j according to some joint density f (τ i ) · f (τ j ) over [0, 180] . In the second, traders choose the time t 1 of their first trade according to f (t 1 ) and then choose the time t 2 for their second trade on [t 1 , 180] according to f (t 2 |t 2 ≥ t 1 ). Applied to our trading setup, the first specification loosely implies that the subjects apply their singletrade timing strategy as independent draws to the two trades; the second specification implies that traders apply the same strategy for the single and first trade and then apply the same strategy of their first trade to their second trade, conditional on the execution of the first trade. Intuitively, the first specification would then imply that the distribution of trade times is such that the first trade for the two-trade specification occurs before the single trade, but that the distributional order for all trades is unclear. 27 The second specification would imply that the distribution of trade times is such that trades for the two-trade specification occur before the single trade, but that there should be no order when comparing the first trade for the two-trade specification with the single trade.
Neither of these benchmarks implies that the first trade of the two-trade specification and all trades taken together from the two-trade specification occur earlier than the single trade from the one-trade specification. Our finding thus indicates that there is an accelerating effect when traders can trade more often that is distinct from the pattern that would emerge from the two benchmarks that we discuss above.
Conclusion
Herding has long been suspected to play a role in financial market booms and busts. Recent theoretical work shows that informational herding is possible if the signal likelihood function for traders has a specific shape. Other work shows that when timing is endogenous to the decision, traders with good or bad news should trade earlier than those with less informative signals. Giving traders a choice of when to act is not only natural, but 26 The idea is that players play a symmetric mixed strategy with full support on the available time interval; implementing this strategy, the probability that a trader has played up to time t can be described by a distribution, and, for simplicity, we assume here that it has density f . 27 We are grateful to an Associate Editor for making this point. In support of this argument we ran the following simulation which assumes that traders play a uniform timing strategy. We first generated 1 million uniformly distributed trades on the [0, 180] interval. These observations are used as the single trade times. We then generated another 2 million observations which are interpreted as trade-times for the two-trade settings. We randomly form 1 million pairs with the smaller element being the first trade, and the larger the second trade. For these trades, we carried out the same distribution computations as for our sample and observed the described pattern. The simulations invoke the Mersenne-Twister method (designed to generate a high level of pseudo-randomness and to avoid serial correlation).
there are also important insights that can be gleaned from such an analysis.
It is not clear ex ante, how the decision to time one's trades should affect herding and contrarianism. One possibility is that when herding-prone types delay their actions systematically, herd behaviour can become more pronounced and significant compared to exogenous timing settings. On the other hand, research by Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005) has revealed that people have a general tendency to act as contrarians. Another possibility thus is that by removing the artificial friction of exogenous timing, herding disappears. Our work directly addresses this open question.
Having collected almost 2000 trades, we found that subjects' decisions were generally in line with the qualitative predictions of the information theory learning theory when that theory admits rational herding and contrarianism. For example, types theoretically prone to herd or be contrarian are the significant and important source of this kind of behaviour when it does arise. Furthermore, types with extreme information about an asset (both good or bad) trade systematically earliest, and those with signals conducive to contrarianism trade earlier than those with information conducive to herding. We thus find strong evidence for the impact of the type of information both with respect to the direction and the timing of trades.
We can break our findings down further into four key messages. First, we find additional and qualitatively novel support for information-based motives for herding theory in the laboratory. Second, adding endogenous-timing leaves the key predictions of sequential herding theory unchanged as far as the direction of trade is concerned. Therefore, our results suggest that earlier work which forces subjects to act in a strict sequence remains valid even though the timing assumptions impose an artificial friction. Third, we combine two literatures by linking information-based trade directions and timing and show that signals that push subjects towards herd or contrarian behaviour also push them towards delay, relative to the signals that guide subjects towards clear buy or sell decisions. This point is a potentially important avenue for future research as the combination of herding/contrarianism in decision-making and clustering in time can work together to potentially exacerbate/counter prices movements which drift away from fundamentals. Finally, we also identify a new experimental stylized fact in that traders tend to cluster their actions in time. This final key finding represents a potentially important avenue for future research. Table 1 Herding and contrarian trades for all traders by treatment.
The first row in each treatment grouping lists how many herding trades were observed, the second row entries list the number of possible herding trades. An S 1 type cannot herd-sell and can herd-buy only if the price has risen. An S 3 type cannot buy-herd and can sell-herd only if the price has fallen. Similarly, an S 1 type cannot be a sell-contrarian and acts as a buy-contrarian only when buying after prices have fallen; conversely for the S 3 types. The description for the herding and contrarian actions for the S 2 types are more involved, but they are described in detail in Section 3. The table represents regressions of the occurrence of a herding trade on the trader receiving a U-shaped signal as expressed in equation (1). Logit regressions report the marginal effects. Linear probability fixed effects regressions control for trader-fixed effects. The data is restricted to include only trades that could potentially be considered as herding trades. At the bottom of the table we include results for F-tests for equality of coefficients when testing whether the impact of a U-shaped signal is different for one vs. two trade treatments. For most cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they coincide. For all tables that follow, standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the trader (individual) level, * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. The table lists summary statistics for return (or round-trip) transactions. Row 1 lists the total trades by types in treatments 4-6 (where two trades are possible). Row 2 lists the number of trades that were first trades. Row 3 lists the number of second trades. A discrepancy between Row 2 and 3 indicates that some people choose not to trade twice (Row 4). Row 5 lists how many of the second trades were classified as return trades (buy-sell or sell-buy). Row 6 lists how many of the return trades lead to an immediate trading profit. Row 7 lists the extend of buy-sell transactions (the remainder are sell-buy). Row 8 lists whether the first trade was in the same direction as prices thus far (i.e. did prices rise and was the first trade a buy or did prices fall and the first trade was a sale). Row 9 computes the same as Row 8 for the second trade. Some "trades" were "passes". For this table we count only the transactions; percentages in rows 5-7 do not add to one as there may be passes. (This affected 55 "trades". Specifically, there were 16 buy-holds, 22 sell-hold, 7 hold-sells, and 7 hold-holds. Most buy-holds (9) stemmed from S 3 types, most sell-holds (9) stemmed from S 1 types.) decreasing increasing hill-shape pU-shape nU-shape All The table condenses six regressions of the equations in lines (5) and (6) (by signal type and then with respect to herding and contrarian behaviour separately). When cells are empty, there was insufficient data or the variable was dropped. Constants were omitted from the report. Standard errors and significance levels are denoted as in Table 2 . Plots for the differences of timing cdfs by signal types for treatments 1-6.
The four panels plot the differences of the distributions of the trading times, split up by signal types. Time is always on the horizontal axis, with 180 seconds signifying the end of trading. Differences of cumulative probabilities are on the vertical axes. The panels are labeled to signify the difference of distributions that was computed. The three panels plot distributions of the trading times, split up by treatments with one and two trades. Axes are as in Figure 1 . The top panel plots the cumulative probabilities for all trades; trades in treatments 4-6 occur (weakly) before those in treatments 1-3. The bottom left panel looks only the distribution of the first trades in treatments 4-6 and all the trades in treatments 1-3: trading occurs earlier in treatments 4-6. The bottom right panel looks only at the distribution of the second trades in treatments 4-6 and all the trades in treatments 1-3: trading occurs earlier in treatments 1-3.
